A lthough dams provide a variety of economic goods and services, including electric power, flood control, water supply, reservoir recreation, and navigational services, they also have detrimental effects on riverine ecosystems (Petts 1984) . As a result, many people want to know the socioeconomic and ecological benefits and costs of rehabilitating or restoring rivers through dam modification or removal (AR/FE/TU 1999).
Cost-benefit analysis is one economic tool that helps decisionmakers choose among policy alternatives (Boardman et al. 1996) . Ideally, cost-benefit analysis includes all of the costs and benefits associated with each policy alternative. In fact, however, costs and benefits can be difficult to measureestimating the value of an endangered species, for exampleor may not be fully recognized at the time a study is conducted. Thus using cost-benefit analysis in evaluating the removal of a dam can challenge even seasoned analysts.
In spite of these limitations, decisionmakers and stakeholders frequently rely on cost-benefit analysis for insights into the potential consequences of modifying or removing dams. The Edwards Dam on the Kennebec River in Maine, removed in 1999, illustrates the point. A cost-benefit study concluded that necessary structural repairs would have cost 1.7 times the cost of removing the dam and restoring anadromous fish passages (AR/FE/TU 1999).
Edwards Dam is small compared with other dams recently under consideration for removal. The US Army Corps of Engineers completed a draft cost-benefit analysis of a proposal to remove a series of four large dams on the lower Snake River in the Pacific Northwest. Wild salmon stocks have dipped perilously low on the river, and many people believe the costs of keeping the dams outweigh the benefits.
In this article, we describe principles we believe are effective in assessing the economic consequences of environmental management decisions. We then describe how those principles might be used for a cost-benefit analysis regarding dam removal using the dams on the lower Snake River as a case study. We examine parts of the US Army Corps of Engineers' draft cost-benefit analysis for these dams and suggest modifications to the Corps' analysis that would more fully account for relevant costs and benefits.
Analytical principles
On 9 September 1998, 78 economists sent a letter to the governors of the four Pacific states and the premier of British Columbia, urging them "to consider the full range of economic consequences" when they and members of their administrations make salmon-management decisions (Whitelaw et al. 1998) . Box 1 presents the six principles that the economists emphasized should guide an assessment or cost-benefit analysis of the economic consequences of practically any environmental management decision, including whether to keep or remove a dam.
Two of the six principles play primary roles by addressing the two key effects of a decision on a dam: (1) the effect of the decision on the value of the goods and services derived from the environmental resources; and (2) the effect on jobs and associated variables, such as incomes and the well-being of communities. The other four play secondary roles, offering guidance on the issues that should be addressed when applying the first two principles. The four secondary principles are just as important as the primary ones, but they play a different role, defining the range of issues that should be taken into account as one looks at the benefits, costs, and effects on jobs.
The first principle-first in order and first in priority-admonishes decisionmakers to consider both the benefits and the costs. Though this may seem eminently reasonable, the economists observed that many economic studies of environmental management decisions predominantly emphasize the costs (Whitelaw et al. 1998) . Doing so reduces the perceived economic importance of the environmental resources. When weighing the benefits and costs, decisionmakers should take into account how their decision would affect all goods and services with economic value, not just those traded in markets with monetary prices. In addition, a full accounting must be provided of the true value of each affected good or service, taking into account the market price, as well as all factors, such as subsidies, taxes, and environmental externalities, that distort the level of supply or demand. (Environmental externalities occur, for example, when those who generate pollution benefit financially while others downstream or downwind pay the costs of the pollution.) Finally, the estimates of economic impacts-costs, benefits, employment consequences, and so on-should be placed in the context of the size and makeup of local and regional economies. Considering impacts without the proper context limits the usefulness of information to decisionmakers or stakeholders.
A decision to remove a dam also would have both positive and negative effects on jobs and incomes. When examining these effects, decisionmakers should take into account the economy's ability to adjust over time to exploit the positive and attenuate the negative. The decision to remove a dam may expand or contract the demand for labor and, hence, increase or decrease job opportunities. The actions taken may affect the quality of life in a local area or region and, hence, influence where people prefer to live, work, play, and shop. Analysis of the employment effects associated with a management decision on a dam must also separate these consequences from the employment consequences associated with larger economic forces and trends unrelated to decisions on the dam, but which may affect local and regional economies in proximity to the dam.
Because the decision on a dam generates both benefits and costs, and produces both positive and negative effects on jobs and incomes, it creates both winners and losers. The economists recommended that such distributional effects not be overlooked. They also emphasized the importance of having a clear understanding of how the decision affects the rights and responsibilities of landowners and resource users. The Primary analytical principles 1. Benefits as well as costs Removing or keeping a dam would generate economic benefits as well as economic costs. Consider them both to understand the full effect on the value of the goods and services derived from streams, forests, and other resources.
Positive as well as negative impacts on jobs
Dealing with a dam would have both positive and negative effects on job opportunities. Consider them both to understand the full effect on workers, their families, and their communities.
Secondary analytical principles 3. Distribution of consequences and fairness
Those who enjoy the benefits or jobs of a decision on a dam would not necessarily be the same as those who would bear the costs or job losses. Consider the full distribution of economic consequences to understand who wins, who loses, and the fairness of the distribution.
Rights and responsibilities
With any decision on a dam, property owners and resource users behave differently than they otherwise would. Consider whether these changes represent infringement of their rights or enforcement of their responsibilities.
Uncertainty and sustainability
Any decision on a dam would rely unavoidably on information insufficient to guarantee the outcome. Consider fully the potentially high costs from decisions yielding undesirable outcomes that are irreversible or extremely difficult to reverse.
More than just salmon conservation
Removing or keeping a dam would have a variety of ecological and economic effects, such as changes in the quality of stream water used for other purposes, that may seem peripheral. But consider all the effects.
Box 1. Six principles that should guide the analysis of the economic consequences of removing or keeping a dam. From a 1998 letter by concerned economists (Whitelaw et al.) to Governors Kitzhaber, Knowles, Locke, and Wilson and Premier Clarke regarding the economic issues of salmon recovery.
value society places on the decision that restricts property owners' rights can differ markedly from the value of otherwise comparable measures that induce the property owners to comply with their responsibilities. In addition, the economists observed that, given the uncertainty regarding a decision to remove a dam, there always is the possibility it would yield undesired outcomes, and care should be taken to avoid outcomes that are costly-or even impossible-to reverse. Finally, the economists stressed that although the primary economic consequences of an environmental management decision have to do with the specific environmental resource itself, others do not. A full analysis should include the costs, benefits, and effects peripheral to the specific resource at issue. The six principles identified in the economists' letter provide an analytical foundation for assessing the costs and benefits of removing a dam. The analytical approach outlined in this section describes the economic implications of removing a dam, from large dams that facilitate barge traffic to small dams such as those that provided water to longabandoned mills. Removing larger dams is likely to generate more significant impacts than removing smaller dams; therefore, depending on the specifics of the dam, a fullblown economic analysis may not be appropriate. (See Trout Unlimited 2001 for information on the economic benefits of removing small dams.) However, a cost-benefit analysis of removing a dam using the principles described in box 1 ensures that the analysis captures the full range of economic consequences.
Application to dams on the lower Snake River
In this section we describe the application of the analytical approach described above to the question of removing the four dams on the lower Snake River in Washington.
Background regarding the impacts of dams on endangered salmon. Four dams are situated in the lower Snake River, between the Snake's confluence with the Columbia River at Pasco, Washington, and Lewiston, Idaho. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) constructed the dams between 1962 and 1975, primarily to create a series of ponds so barges could reach Lewiston, and secondarily to provide easy access to water for irrigation and to generate hydroelectricity.
Wild salmon stocks returning to the Snake River have plummeted since the dams' construction, and a chorus of fisheries biologists and others has called for breaching or bypassing the dams, that is, removing the earthen mounds adjacent to the concrete portions of the dams and letting the rivers run free. Proponents argue that breaching the dams would, among other things, restore endangered wild salmon, return traditional sites and fisheries to Indian tribes, improve water quality, reduce taxpayer subsidies to corporate irrigators and barging companies, and comply with numerous laws and treaties. Opponents claim such actions would prove prohibitively costly, even wreck the Northwest's economy.
In December 1999, the US Army Corps of Engineers released a draft Feasibility Report/Environmental Impact Statement (FR/EIS), which, among other things, provides an estimate of the economic effects of breaching the four dams on the lower Snake River (USACE 1999a) . The FR/EIS describes, to varying degrees, the costs and benefits of dam removal on different sectors of the regional and national economies, including tribal interests; recreational use; anadromous fisheries; irrigated agriculture; transportation; electrical utilities; and municipal, industrial, and private water use.
In the remainder of this article, we evaluate the Corps' analysis of the economic effects of breaching the dams in light of the analytical principles described in box 1. We have limited our critique of the Corps' analysis to the primary analytical principles of the overall costs and benefits of removing the dams and the associated impacts on jobs. Readers interested in a more in-depth discussion of the primary analytical principles and the related secondary principles as they apply to the Corps' cost-benefit analysis should consult ECONorthwest (1999 ECONorthwest ( , 2000 .
Evaluating the Corps' analysis of economic effects.
First we describe the overall structure of the Corps' cost-benefit analysis, and then we review the Corps' analysis of costs and benefits. This section concludes with our critique of the Corps' analysis of the employment impacts of removing the dams.
The Corps' overall analytical approach. When federal agencies such as the Corps conduct cost-benefit analyses of proposed water projects, they typically follow the Principles and Guidelines developed by the US Water Resources Council (USWRC) in the early 1970s to provide guidance on decisionmaking and analytical procedures as they apply to water resources. The Principles and Guidelines, which replaced the Principles and Standards, were last updated in 1983 (USWRC 1983) . Other federal agencies that use the Principles and Guidelines are the Bureau of Reclamation, the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and the Tennessee Valley Authority (NRC 1999) . According to the Corps (USACE 1999b) , the Principles and Guidelines recommend that a cost-benefit analysis include the following socioeconomic factors:
• National economic development (NED) effects, which describe the changes in the economic value of the national output of goods and services
• Environmental quality effects, which describe nonmonetary consequences for significant natural and cultural resources
• Regional economic development (RED) effects, which address changes in the distribution of regional economic activity such as jobs and income
• Other social effects, which describe potential effects from relevant perspectives that are not reflected in the other three types of effects
In spite of the comprehensive approach outlined in the Principles and Guidelines, the Corps considered only a portion of this information in its decisionmaking process for the dams on the lower Snake. The Corps' FR/EIS states,"The NED account is the only account required under the WRC [Water Resources Council] guidelines" (appendix I, pp. I1-1-I1-2). As calculated by the Corps, the impact of dam removal on the value of the nation's goods and services apparently determined the outcome of its cost-benefit analysis.
The National Research Council (NRC) reviewed the Corps' use of the Principles and Guidelines in a number of applications and concluded that the Corps' approach ignores important impacts, is out-of-date, and does not reflect current thinking on the role that water resources play in local, regional, or national economies (NRC 1999) . The NRC concluded (pp. 4-5):
While they were in effect, the P&S [Principles and Standards] were consistently reviewed and updated by federal and other water planning specialists. By contrast, the P&G [Principles and Guidelines] have not received the same degree of attention and, as a result, do not adequately reflect contemporary water resource planning principles and practices.... Movement away from consideration of the National Economic Development (NED) account [is] the most important concern. Today, ecological and social considerations are often of great importance in project planning and should not necessarily be considered secondary to the maximization of economic benefits. Strict adherence to the NED account may discourage consideration of innovative and nonstructural approaches to water resources planning.... In summary, the committee recommends that the federal Principles and Guidelines be thoroughly reviewed and modified to incorporate contemporary analytical techniques and changes in public values and federal agency programs.
Applying the NRC's criticisms of the Corps' overall analytical approach to the analysis of impacts of removing the Snake River dams, we see that the Corps' analysis provides limited useful information and misleading results. For example, as we describe below, the Corps' NED analysis is incomplete because, among other deficiencies, it excludes the impact of subsidies. Thus the Corps violated the first principle in box 1 of considering the full range of economic benefits and costs. Even though the Corps estimated RED impacts, they ignored these impacts during the decisionmaking process and focused exclusively on the NED impacts. By excluding RED impacts from the decisionmaking process, they violated the second principle of considering the full range of employment impacts. Likewise, the Corps excluded the range of secondary analytical principles in box 1 from its analysis.
Changes in benefits and costs. The Corps' analysis of costs and benefits-the NED effects described in the Principles and Guidelines, and the effects that drove the Corps' decisionmaking process-has significant deficiencies. We first discuss two of the major drawbacks of the Corps' analysis: excluding subsidies from the cost-benefit analysis and ignoring benefits associated with tribal circumstances and nonmarket values. The former overestimates the cost of taking out the dams. The latter underestimates the benefits of taking out the dams. We then discuss the Corps' results and place these results in the context of the regional economy of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho.
Certain sectors of the region's economy that rely on the dams benefit from subsidies provided by the federal government. In effect, taxpayers throughout the United States subsidize the economic activities and profits of these businesses. Taking out the dams would generate negative economic consequences for these businesses, but there are positive economic consequences for US taxpayers because they would no longer pay subsidies to these businesses.
Transportation is one example. Snake River waterway users pay a fuel tax that generates a few hundred thousand dollars annually, which covers but a small portion of the actual costs of using the waterways. Federal taxpayers make up the difference, contributing $10 million annually to subsidize transportation's share of operations and maintenance costs for the Snake River dams (Dickey 1999) . The Corps did not include this and other subsidies in their analysis. For example, describing the analysis of transportation impacts, the FR/EIS states,"The analysis does not take into consideration the effects of taxes or subsidies, which represent transfer payments within the national economy" (USACE 1999b, p. I3-62) . Furthermore, subsidies are more wide-reaching than simply transferring wealth from one group to another. When a service, such as transportation along the Snake River, is subsidized, so that users do not face a price reflecting the full production cost, they have an economic incentive to consume more of the service than they would otherwise. The Corps' cost-benefit analysis failed to account for this overconsumption, which biases the analysis in favor of those sectors of the economy that receive subsidies.
In estimating the benefits from breaching the dams, the Corps excluded a number of relevant values, including triberelated benefits and the benefits that all of us gain from the existence of both the increased salmon runs and a free-flowing lower Snake River. First, the Corps' estimate of triberelated benefits included the number of acres of sacred and traditional sites that the tribes would regain access to, as well as the number of pounds of fish from treaty-protected subsistence and ceremonial fisheries, but it did not include the economic benefits that tribal members and other Northwesterners and Americans would gain from these changes (USACE 1999b) . In not doing so, it overlooked economic benefits to tribal members that constitute real increases in the value of national goods and services. As a result, the Corps underestimated how breaching the dams would benefit the tribes, and how that, in turn, would benefit all of us.
Second, the Corps excluded from its cost-benefit tally what it calls passive-use benefits that Northwesterners and other Americans would enjoy from both the increased salmon runs and from converting the lower Snake to 140 miles of free-flowing river. These values come not from using the resourcesthe salmon or the river-but from knowing the salmon and the free-flowing river exist and that future generations would get to enjoy them. These values aren't trivial. Economists working for the Corps estimated that the passive-use values of these two resources range from $486 million to nearly $1.3 billion (USACE 1999b) . The Corps' estimates of the overall costs and benefits of taking out the dams ranged from a net cost of $300 million to a net benefit of $1.3 billion, in 1998 dollars (Whitelaw 2000) . If passive-use values were incorporated into the Corps' overall estimate of net costs and benefits, the range would change to a low of $186 million net benefits and a high of $2.6 billion net benefits. This huge range stems largely from the wide range in the estimates of the benefits from river recreation that would result from breaching the dams, a range of $11 million to $1.5 billion (USACE 1999b) .
Personal income provides one measure of the ability of a region to pay for some good, service, or action. In this case it serves as a context for the Corps' cost-benefit results. Comparing the region's personal income with the net costs or benefits of taking out the dams provides insights into the relative expense or benefit of the action. Personal income in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho in 2000 exceeded $310 billion (USDC 2001) . The Corps' worst-case estimate of net costs of $300 million represents 0.1% of the region's personal income. The actual impacts would be even smaller because, as we described above, the Corps overestimated the costs and underestimated the benefits of taking out the dams.
Employment impacts. In spite of the Corps' emphasis on changes in costs and benefits at the national level, the impacts on jobs, especially jobs in the local and regional economy, are what concern many people. We discuss how the Corps' analysis overstates the employment impacts and then place the Corps' analytical results in the proper context, in this case, the local and regional economies that would be affected by the decision. We also illustrate the importance of considering relevant economic forces and trends in an analysis of employment impacts. Figure 1 summarizes the Corps' estimates of the effects that breaching the dams would have on jobs, that is, the regional economic development effects. (See ECONorthwest 1999 and Whitelaw 2000 for a detailed discussion of the employment impacts of bypassing the dams.) According to the Corps, breaching the dams would create 13,400 to 27,700 short-term jobs during the decade of deconstruction and construction (USACE 1999b) .
In the long term, there would be job losses and gains. The biggest gains, between 1475 and 3126 jobs, would result from improved recreational tourism and angling opportunities. The largest losses of long-term jobs would occur in irrigated agriculture (between 901 and 2256 jobs), the operations of the existing dams and locks (between 1193 and 1651), and reduced spending caused by increased electricity rates (between 1534 and 2382). Taking the midpoints of the ranges shown in figure 1, breaching the dams would cause a net loss of 1081 longterm jobs in the Pacific Northwest (4200 jobs gained, 5281 jobs lost). The Corps generated ranges of employment impacts by using low, medium, and high scenarios for various data and assumptions.
The Corps overestimated the negative employment consequences of bypassing the dams because it failed to account for the economic forces and trends acting on the relevant economies. The tool the Corps employed to estimate the impact of breaching on jobs and incomes "presents a picture of the economy at a single point in time," the Corps states, and that point is 1995 (USACE 1999b, p. I6-5) . Furthermore, the Corps assumes "the long-run effects are permanent and continue for the 100-year period analyzed in this study" (USACE 1999b, p. I6-3) . In other words, the Corps assumed that the basic structure of the economy would remain fixed in its 1995 form, unchanged for the next 100 years. For example, the Corps estimated a maximum of 2256 jobs would be lost in irrigated agriculture (figure 1). To arrive at 2256, the Corps assumed that, when breaching the dams eliminates reservoir water for irrigation, the affected 13 corporate farms would take out of production all 37,000 acres of their farmland. This assumption ignores other possible outcomes, including switching to groundwater, adopting different irrigation practices, and altering crops. In effect, the Corps assumed that the owners of these corporate assets would quit and the assets would remain idle for 100 years. Furthermore, the Corps assumed, in effect, that for the next century, those who lost their jobs as a result would never work again; local and regional firms that otherwise would have sold goods and services to those who lost their jobs instead would lose those sales and wouldn't find replacement sales; owners of the farming enterprises wouldn't switch to any other economic activities; and those throughout the chain who lost their jobs would act exactly the same way as the original job losers in that they would never work again.
The Corps' rigid analytical structure produces an extreme worst-case scenario, unsupported by economic theory or by the historical performance of the local and regional economies. The Corps' analysis freezes all economic interactions in 1995. Such a constraint ignores the dynamic adjustments that economies-employees and employers, buyers and sellers, savers and investors, and all other economic decisionmakersundertake all the time. For example, since the four dams began service, the agricultural sector experienced four major contractions, each of which affected more than 2256 workers, the maximum that breaching the dams would affect, the Corps predicts. And yet the local and regional economies have expanded steadily during this period (USDC 1998 , ECONorthwest 1999 .
These data and economic trends indicate that a snapshot of lost jobs at a point in time tells very little about how a real economy reacts to the breaching of four dams or any other changes. Such rigid and unrealistic assumptions cannot produce a credible forecast of economic consequences under the breaching scenario. University of Montana economist Tom Power equates such an analytical approach to driving by looking in the rearview mirror (Power 1996) .
A comprehensive assessment of likely employment consequences of bypassing dams would include these elements:
• Feasible alternatives to permanently idling assets that are negatively affected by the bypass
• Information on the average periods of unemployment in the local and regional economies
• Likely mitigation options that would reduce negative employment consequences
• Projected employment demand in economic sectors unaffected by the bypass It is instructive to put these estimates in perspective. By the end of 2000, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho had approximately 6.2 million workers (USDC 2001) . For the three states, the net loss of 1081 jobs would amount to less than 0.02% of all jobs. For the counties in southeastern Washington, northeastern Oregon, and central Idaho near the lower Snake River-the counties the Corps treated as the relevant local economy-the Corps estimated a net loss of 711 long-term jobs, less than 0.3% of the employment in these 15 counties. (In 1996, the local economy of the 15 counties that border the lower Snake River employed approximately 266,000 workers.) For another perspective, compare the total number of jobs the Corps predicted would be lost-5281 gross, not net-with the 25,000 jobs lost in Oregon and Washington's timber industry during the past decade (USDC 2000) .
Placing the Corps' results regarding employment impacts in the context of the size of the local and regional economies (and ignoring the issues raised by the NRC) indicates that bypassing the dams would generate minimal negative employment consequences relative to the size of the local and regional economies. Even though the negative employment impacts would be minimal overall, they represent hardships for the affected workers and their families. The limited nature of the negative impacts, however, means that mitigating the negative employment consequences would be manageable. (For more information on mitigation options, see ECONorthwest 1999.)
Discussion and conclusions
In a 27 July 1999 speech, Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) claimed that removing the four Snake River dams would be an "unmitigated disaster and an economic nightmare" (Hughes 1999) . In February 2000, George W. Bush said, "Breaching the [Snake River] dams would be a big mistake....The economy and jobs of much of the Northwest depend on the dams" (Seattle Times, 26 February 2000, p. A1). In its 1 May 2000 editorial, the Oregonian likened breaching the dams to "taking a sledgehammer to the Northwest economy." The Clinton administration, perhaps sensitive to these claims, decided to leave the dams in place while other salmonrecovery methods were attempted.
Just 10 years ago, many politicians offered similar predictions on the disastrous effects of protecting the northern spotted owl. Representative Bob Smith (R-OR) predicted the owl listing would "wreak havoc on the people and economy of the Pacific Northwest" (Ulrich and Ota 1990) . During a campaign swing through the Pacific Northwest in 1992, President George Bush warned, "It is time we worried not only about endangered species, but endangered jobs" (Hong and Yang 1992) . President Bush and many of the other politicians in those years-Senators Mark Hatfield and Bob Packwood and Representative Bob Smith-embraced the simplistic logic of owls versus jobs, just as some today frame the dambreaching debate as salmon versus jobs: We can protect endangered jobs, or we can protect endangered species, but not both.
In fact, the Pacific Northwest economy has boomed, consistently outperforming the national economy, whether measured by jobs, income, or sheer exuberance, throughout the 1990s. Between 1988 and 1998, logging in Oregon and Wash-ington fell 91% on federal lands and 52% overall, and timber-industry employment dropped 20%. But new jobs in other sectors offset these losses. Total employment actually increased 31%, while inflation-adjusted per capita income grew 26% (USDC 2000 , Warren 1990 . Ten years ago this region had never experienced widespread economic changes to protect a species. The current deliberations on the fate of the Snake River dams would benefit from a consideration of these experiences and the implications for developing and conducting cost-benefit analyses. Ignoring the constraints inherent in the Corps' analysis and the resulting biases that overestimate costs and underestimate benefits, the jobs losses predicted by the Corps do not describe a "disaster," "nightmare," or "sledgehammer" for either the local or the regional economy.
An incomplete or otherwise flawed analysis lends itself to such misrepresentation. It also fails to characterize accurately the range of potential economic consequences. By applying the analytical principles in box 1, however, cost-benefit analysts would meet the relevant professional standards and, not incidentally, provide more useful information to decisionmakers. For emphasis and clarification, we describe below the important components of the two primary analytical principles.
Measure all relevant costs, benefits, and employment gains and losses. A policy decision will rarely, if ever, generate only costs or only benefits. The impacts of removing dams, for example, extend far beyond dams, fish, and farmers, just as the Pacific Northwest found that the impacts of restricting logging extended far beyond owls and timber workers. In some cases a policy decision may generate costs or benefits some distance away from the area directly affected by the decision. For example, removing a dam may influence populations of anadromous fish, which in turn influences incomes and employment far downstream in coastal communities engaged in commercial fishing.
Account for all costs and benefits including subsidies and externalities. Ignoring the subsidies to the transportation sector overestimates the true costs of the bypass. To the extent that the existence and operation of a dam generates negative externalities, such as raising the temperature of the water, removing a dam yields benefits.
Place the estimated costs and benefits in the appropriate context. In this case, the context for an analysis of removing the dams is the same as it was for protecting the spotted owl: the local and regional economies affected by the decision.
The goal of cost-benefit analyses is providing decisionmakers and others with useful information on the range of likely economic consequences of policy decisions. As with other analytical efforts, the overall structure of the analysis influences the extent to which this goal is achieved. We believe that the set of principles outlined in this article provide a sound framework for estimating the costs and benefits of removing dams.
